What determines the price of insurance against default of advanced economies? Our laboratory to answer this question is the credit default swap (CDS) market on government debt of 16 advanced economies. The price of credit protection on these countries shows a strong degree of co-movement, has severely increased since the beginning of the financial crisis, and remains at elevated levels. We document that the state of the world financial system, and since the beginning of the crisis also the state of a country's domestic financial system, have strong explanatory power for the behavior of CDS spreads, and that the magnitude of this impact depends on the relative importance of a countrys financial system pre-crisis. Furthermore, it matters whether a country is a member of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU). Although the level of CDS spreads is lower for countries in the EMU, their sensitivities to the health of the financial system are higher compared to non-EMU members. While one would expect the unconditional risk of default to be low in case of advanced economies, our results suggest the presence of an important economic channel in adverse economic times: a private-to-public risk transfer through which market participants incorporate their expectations about financial industry bailouts and the potential burden of government intervention.
Introduction
The collapse of US and global real estate prices in 2007 initiated an international financial crisis which subsequently spread to the real economy. Established financial institutions in the US and Europe suffered large losses, driven by write-downs related to sub-prime mortgages, a decline in the availability of credit and damaged investor confidence. While central banks expanded monetary policy and engaged in quantitative easing in an effort to stabilize the economy, governments provided unprecedented levels of public financial assistance to ailing institutions. As fiscal concerns following government-funded stabilization programs come to the fore, the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market for advanced economies has become less obscure and increasingly liquid. Out of the ten largest single name CDS exposures by net notional, seven are now European advanced economies. 1 Furthermore, since September 2009 investors can trade index products on a basket of Western European sovereign CDS in addition to the long-standing emerging markets and corporate CDS indices.
While CDS on emerging market debt have received much attention in the literature, research on the credit risk of more advanced economies has been sparse. Our analysis builds on the work of Boehmer and Megginson (1990) and Edwards (1984) , who focus on the determinants of the yield spreads of emerging market debt, as well as Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2009) , who examine the sources of commonality in emerging markets CDS spreads. In contrast to the emerging markets literature, we study the determinants of the price of insurance against default of developed nations, using a new data set containing CDS spreads of 16 advanced economies.
The cross-section of these sovereign CDS spreads exhibits a strong degree of commonality. The first principal component of spread changes explains roughly 74% of variation, whereas the first three principal components cumulatively account for 89%. We document that, above and beyond the factors of commonality suggested by Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2009) , the state of the world financial system, and since the beginning of the financial crisis also the state of a country's domestic financial system, have strong explanatory power for the behavior of CDS spreads. This finding suggests a private-to-public risk transfer through which market participants incorporate their expectations about financial industry bailouts and the potential burden of government intervention. Our interpretation is motivated by Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001) , who argue that the principal cause of the 1997 Asian currency crisis was the future deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to the failing domestic financial system. Similarly, European countries extended significant amounts of loans to local banks in order to prevent large bank failures, partially recapitalized financial institutions by taking on equity stakes and outright nationalized certain firms deemed to pose a systemic risk to the economy. These actions may have led market participants to assume government guarantees on the liabilities of the financial sector, and in many cases these liabilities were large. Ireland's aggregate bank assets between 2003 and 2006, for example, were on average almost five times as large as its GDP.
Our analysis relies on the empirically observed correlation patterns between sovereign CDS spreads and the stock market performance of the local and global financial services industry. 2 We formulate and test four hypotheses related to a potential private-to-public risk transfer. First, we show that the magnitude of this economic channel depends on the relative importance of a countrys financial system pre-crisis. CDS spreads of countries whose domestic economies relied heavily on the financial services industry pre-crisis show a stronger co-movement with the health of the domestic and international financial system. This result appears consistent with the popular belief about governments absorbing risks of private sectors during the recent crisis, and may not seem surprising.
However, to our knowledge, we are the first to quantify this economic channel in market
prices.
Secondly, we analyze two sources of country heterogeneity: whether a country is a member of the Monetary and Economic Union of the European Union (EMU), and how exposed a country's financial system was to the sub-prime mortgage sector. The level of CDS spreads is, on average, 50-70bps lower for countries in the EMU, which is consistent with results based on government yields as in Lund (1999) . But we also show their sensitivities to shocks to the global and local financial system are higher compared to non-EMU members, suggesting the private-to-public risk transfer was larger for countries operating under a supra-national monetary authority. Specifically, the sensitivities of EMU member countries are twice as large compared to non-EMU members -likely a reflection of those countries' inability to individually control Euro money supply. Since we do not observe bank-level holding data on sub-prime mortgage securities, we estimate countries' exposures through a correlation study of domestic financial firms' returns and the ABX.HE index -a popular index tracking the price performance of subprime securities. We find that a country's exposure to the US sub-prime sector does not significantly alter the magnitude of the private-to-public risk transfer. This seems surprising given the widely-held belief that the roots of the current crisis and much of the associated losses can be traced to the sub-prime sector. However, we acknowledge that this finding could also be due to an imprecise measure of risk exposure.
Lastly, the importance of the financial sector should also be reflected in CDS spread levels, not only in changes, and investigating levels has the advantage that we can control for a country's indebtedness. A deterioration of the financial system might lead to lower levels of output, or additional debt may be needed to finance government deficits associated with a risk transfer, thus increasing leverage. For example, high budget deficits and an ailing economy in Greece led to a significant widening of CDS spreads since December 2009, fueling the discussion about a potential credit event. We find that a country's pre-crisis exposure to the financial system explains on average 39bps, above and beyond its debt to GDP ratio explaining 26bps. While such a difference appears large, it is of course an ex-ante perspective -government guarantees that were triggered should be reflected in country-specific fundamentals ex-post. We employ several explanatory variables that market participants might use in assessing the distance to a country's default barrier. For example, a country's stock market volatility matters, which is consistent with predictions that arise from an ability-to-repay model as in Claessens and Pennacchi (1996) . In addition, the impact of stock market volatility has increased substantially in magnitude during the financial crisis.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 describes the data, and discusses the mechanics of the Western European sovereign CDS market. Section 3 studies the comovement between the performance of the financial system and sovereign CDS spreads, in the time series and the cross section as well as in changes and in levels. We conclude in Section 4.
Data Description
We first briefly discuss the mechanics of the sovereign CDS market. For an in-depth discussion of pricing and modeling of CDS contracts see for example Duffie and Singleton (2003) .
Mechanics of the Sovereign CDS Market
A sovereign CDS is a bilateral over-the-counter agreement between two parties to exchange cash-flows based on future contingencies. The CDS seller provides insurance to the buyer in case a credit event occurs in an obligation issued by the reference entity.
In exchange for credit protection, the CDS buyer pays an amount equal to the spread times the notional to the protectional seller on a semi-annual basis for the maturity of the contract or the occurrence of a credit event, whichever is sooner. In case a credit event occurs, the CDS buyer pays the accrued coupon for the period and delivers the defaulted obligation to the seller for a payment of par value (physical settlement), or receives the difference between par value and the market price (cash settlement). Important for our case, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) defines a credit event for a sovereign issuer as obligation acceleration, failure to pay, restructuring or repudiation/moratorium.
For a bond to qualify as the reference obligation, it should be a deliverable obligation as defined by ISDA. In the case of emerging markets sovereign CDS, only bonds issued non-domestically in a standard specified currency (USD, Euro, Yen, Canadian dollar, Franc, and Pound) are considered admissible, see Pan and Singleton (2008) . This is similar in the case of Western European sovereign CDS -if a country has outstanding foreign currency debt issued in a standard specified currency, these bonds are considered to be deliverable obligations. However, if a sovereign does not have any outstanding foreign currency debt, the deliverable obligation is the domestic local-currency debt.
Lastly, in the case of Eurozone sovereigns, EUR denominated debt can be considered a deliverable obligation, alongside any other foreign currency debt in one of the standard currencies.
In order to mitigate counterparty risk, parties can be asked to post cash-equivalent collateral. But the possibility that a credit event on an advanced industrial country would coincide with a severe market disruption, rendering one or both of the counterparties unable to fulfil their contractual obligations, remains. We acknowledge that such jump to default risk exists, and point out two additional factors with respect to our study: First, banks will generally not trade the CDS contract on their domestic sovereign. Second, a negative shock to the financial system should decrease the conditional expected payoff of a CDS contract solely from the perspective of counterparty risk, which is the opposite direction of our findings about the empirical correlation between sovereign CDS spreads and the state of the financial sector.
The Dataset
We utilize proprietary data from the credit trading desk of a large US bank, containing end-of-day 10-year sovereign CDS mid-quotes for 16 countries from January 2003 to We use both weekly spread levels, denoted CDS it , as well as changes, denoted ∆CDS it , which yields a total of 1,901 country-week observations for levels, and 1,523 country-week observations for non-overlapping changes. Table 1 Ireland's credit swap spread, for example, peaked at 369bps, a more than hundredfold increase over its pre-crisis lows. Even Germany experienced a CDS spread more than 30 times the magnitude of its 2006 levels.
Principal Component Analysis
To further quantify the degree of such commonality, we conduct a principal component analysis in the spirit of Longstaff et al. (2009) , see Table 2 . Panel A lists the cumulative percentage of explained variation in CDS spread changes by the first five principal components. To assess the economic significance of the explained variation, we also conduct a principal component analysis of the weekly domestic stock market returns of the sovereigns, respectively. 4
The first principal component alone explains 74% of sample variation, whereas the first five principal components explain 94%. For domestic stock market returns the first principal component explains 66% of sample variation, and the first five principal components explain 84%. Although both equity returns and spread changes exhibit a large degree of commonality, CDS spreads appear to display stronger cross-sectional correla- The equity market factor and the carry trade factor are significantly negatively related to the first principal component, such that a one standard deviation change in the Stoxx 50 leads to a negative 0.46 standard deviation change in the first principal component. Contrary to the findings of Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2009) , the VIX appear to be unrelated to the first principal component. In specification (2), we add the return of a world financials index to the regression. This inclusion adds to the explanatory power of the regression showing a 6% increase in the R 2 value.
4 As a proxy for local stock market performance, we utilize the Dow Jones Total Market Indices. These are float-adjusted market capitalization weighted country-specific indices aiming to represent the domestic common stock universe. Also included are securities with the characteristics of common equities, such as REITs. Our empirical results are robust to using alternative country-specific indices. All indices are USD-denominated.
Furthermore, the coefficient estimate is large and highly significant, and the world financials factor drives out entirely the equity market factor -suggesting that the first principal component is strongly correlated with the state of the world financial system, a finding that we explore further in the next section.
Empirical Analysis
The starting point of our empirical analysis is Longstaff et al. (2009) . They specify a set of factors that proxy for underlying sources of commonality in emerging market CDS spreads. Since countries in our sample are in geographical proximity to Europe, we first construct the European equivalent factors.
Explanatory Variables
We sort the covariates into three groups -local, global, and risk premium variables.
Local Variables. We consider three variables capturing the state of the domestic macroeconomy: (i) the weekly return of the USD-denominated Dow Jones Total Market country index, (ii) the weekly return of the exchange rate relative to the USD, and (iii) the weekly change in the USD-value of exchange rate reserves, in billions. 5
Global Variables. Four variables proxy for the state of the global macroeconomy: (i) the weekly return of the USD-denominated Euro Stoxx 50 Index 6 , (ii) the weekly percentage change in the yield to the 10 year German Bund, (iii) the weekly change in the spread between BBB European Corporates and AA European Corporates (investment grade spread), (iv) the weekly change in the spread between BB European Corporates and BBB European Corporates (high yield spread). Furthermore, two variables proxy for global investment flows (in USD billions): (i) the weekly change in total net inflows to long-term US equity mutual funds, (ii) the weekly change in total net inflows to long-term US bond mutual funds; unfortunately, to our knowledge there is no publicly available European equivalent.
Risk Premium Variables. We use two variables to proxy for risk premia: (i) weekly changes in the price to earnings ratio for the Euro Stoxx 50 (equity premium proxy),
(ii) weekly changes in the spread between the V2X volatility implied index (implied volatility of the Euro Stoxx 50) and the weekly realized volatility as measured by the Garman and Klass (1980) volatility estimator.
Preliminary Analysis

Country by Country Regressions
To identify which of the covariates have explanatory power for CDS spread changes, we specify a regression given by
where X it is the matrix of factor observations and β i is a vector of standardized regression coefficients. 7 The coefficients are scaled by the ratio of the standard deviation of the independent variable relative to the standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Hence, a regression coefficient of -0.5 implies that a one standard deviation move in the independent variable results in a -0.5 standard deviation move in the dependent variable. Furthermore, all independent variables are demeaned.
The results of the country-by-country regressions are displayed in Table 3 . Casual inspection reveals that commonality in CDS spreads does not appear to be captured by any of the covariates. The market factor is only significant at the 5% level in six of the 16 countries in the sample; no other covariate is significant in more than six countries, and many variables are only significant in one or two countries. Confirming the results in Longstaff et al. (2009) , we find that local factors generally perform poorly relative to their global counterparts. The local index is only significant at the 5% level in four of the countries and carries considerably smaller loadings than the market factor in those cases.
We find different results compared to Longstaff et al. (2009) and Pan and Singleton (2008) for the volatility risk premium factor. Even though our sample covers an episode of crisis and market turmoil, the volatility risk premium is statistically insignificant in all of the countries, which also echoes the results found in the principal component analysis in Table 2 .
Local and Global Financials
The time series of the first principal component of CDS spread changes is significantly correlated with the global performance of financial services firms. Motivated by this, we include two new covariates in the regression setup: (i) the weekly return of an index of domestic financial services firms, and (ii) the weekly return of a global index of financial services firms.
To capture the state of local financials, we use the Dow Jones Total Market (DJTM) Financials index, a float adjusted market capitalization weighted sector index denominated in USD and available for all countries in our sample. This index aims to represent the investable universe of financial services firms in each country. As for the return to global financials, we again use the MSCI World Financials index. However, returns to the MSCI index tend to be strongly correlated with returns to the Euro Stoxx 50 index, potentially leading to the issue of collinearity. While collinearity per se is not a problem in judging the overall fit of our model, it interferes with our ability to sensibly interpret the coefficients. Hence, we first orthogonalize the world financials return by regressing it on the market return, and assume the sum of the estimated residuals and intercept to be our return to world financials. We let R W F t denote the orthogonalized return to world financials.
Similarly, we orthogonalize the return to domestic financial firms. We are interested in creating a variable measuring the performance of local financial firms independent of market returns and global financials returns. Hence, we regress returns of the local financials on returns to the market index and returns to global financials, and assume the sum of the estimated residuals and intercept to be our orthogonalized return, denoted
We modify the specification in equation 1 such that
The point estimates of γ i , shown in Table 4 , are highly significant and large in absolute magnitudes in 10 of the 16 countries, suggesting the performance of the world financial system may be an important source of commonality. Interestingly, the estimates of δ i are significant in four countries, all of which also have significant estimates for γ i , suggesting the performance of the local financial system had an impact above and beyond the health of the global financial system. The fit of the model also seems considerably improved relative to equation 1: the minimum R 2 is 34% relative to 26%
in Table 3 whereas the maximum R 2 rises to 64% in the case of Ireland, relative to 56%
for Sweden before.
Panel Regressions
To further assess the significance of the financial factors, we construct a panel. And since trading in advanced economies sovereign CDS was relatively sparse pre-2007, a pooled sample also allows us to differentiate between the pre and post crisis periods.
We specify the country fixed-effects panel regression as
and interact R W F t and R LF it with an indicator function taking a value of zero before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (9/15/2008) and a value of one afterwards. Although several observers may argue that the financial crisis began in 2007 with the demise of Bear Stearns, we believe that only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers did the passthrough effects of the market turmoil significantly affect sovereign credit risk. Indeed, Figure 1 shows most of the widening in spreads happened in the immediate aftermath of Lehman's bankruptcy. Hence, we choose 9/15/2008 as our pre-post crisis breakpoint. 8
The estimates of specification (1) in Table 5 confirm our findings of the countryby-country regressions, in that the return to local and global financials is a significant determinant. 9 Furthermore, the coefficients are also economically large: a one standard deviation increase in the return to the global financials, for example, entails a 0.2 standard deviation decrease in the CDS spread. In terms of absolute magnitude, this coefficient estimate is only second to the market factor. Specification (2) accounts for pre and post crisis differences, showing much of the covariation between financials and sovereign CDS spreads is an artefact of the post-Lehman time period, and the covariation with the local financial system is indeed insignificant pre-Lehman.
Private-to-Public Risk Transfer
Our results thus far may indicate that the Lehman bankruptcy event and the ensuing government interventions led market participants to price in a transfer of risk from private institutions to the public sector, which affected the dynamics of sovereign CDS market prices, a channel that will now be explored in more depth.
8 Our results are robust to changing the cut-off point within the two weeks encompassing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Since the sovereign CDS market for advanced economies did not trade liquidly prior to 2007, breakpoints surrounding the demise of Bear Stearns suffer from an inadequate number of observations pre-crisis.
9 All return variables are expressed in decimal form. Hence, a 0.01 unit increase in a return-based regressor corresponds to a 1% increase. The units of all other explanatory variables are outlined above.
Measuring Exposure to the Financial System
If sovereign credit risk embedded in CDS spreads truly covaries with the health of the financial system, we expect this effect to be stronger in countries with higher exposure to the financial system. Countries in which the financial sector plays a larger role may need to take larger ownership stakes, extend more support programs and assume more bank liabilities to stabilize their economy, thus increasing their country risk. The channel through which a sovereign's default probability and expected recovery is affected can manifest in different ways. Government support programs for ailing financial firms, for example, may require the sovereign to issue more debt, thus increasing the leverage ratio. In the long run, the desire to monetize some of the domestic debt outstanding may also stoke inflation, which could affect the sovereign's ability to repay debt.
There exist several measures that may capture the exposure of a country to its financial system. We focus on two measures, a stock-based measure and a flow-based 
Explaining CDS Spread Changes
Hypothesis 1. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price of sovereign CDS, then we expect this effect to be stronger in high θ i (∆BA i ) versus low
To see whether this is the case, we stratify the sample by θ i . All 16 countries are sorted by the magnitude of θ i and then placed in one of two bins. The low-θ bin contains the bottom eight countries, whereas the high bin contains the top eight. We then estimate the regression
for each of the two bins j={low,high}. If Hypothesis 1 is correct, we expect that |γ high |−|γ low | > 0, and |δ high |−|δ low | > 0. The results are presented in Table 7 under the single sorts tab. The loadings on world and local financials for the high-θ bin are larger in absolute magnitude than the corresponding loadings for the low-θ bin. Furthermore, the difference |γ high | − |γ low | is statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas the difference |δ high | − |δ low | is significant at the 5% level. This suggests countries with a large exposure to the domestic financial sector pre-crisis were indeed more strongly affected by the health of the global and local financial system. In particular, credit risk the for low-θ countries was not significantly affected by the health of the local financial system. Market participants, however, appeared to be concerned about the systemic risk posed by a deterioration in the world financial sector. We also conduct this analysis using ∆BA i to stratify the sample, the results are qualitatively similar.
We also expect this effect to be present in a cross-sectional setting. Specifically, we interact the local financials return, R LF it , with θ i (∆BA i ) whilst controlling for R LF it and θ i (∆BA i ) separately. Assuming the regression model given by
where z i stand for either θ i or ∆BA i , and ν t denotes a time fixed-effect, we expect ρ to be negative so that a change in R LF it is augmented for countries with large z i . 11 Table  8 reports the estimation results for Equation 5, with z i = θ i in specification (1) and z i = ∆BA i in specification (2), confirming Hypothesis 1. 12 A one standard deviation change to the return to the domestic financial system leads to a 4bps reduction in the CDS spread, holding θ fixed at unity. Furthermore, the local index return, the local exchange rate return and the change in local foreign exchange reserves all significantly co-move with changes in the sovereign CDS spread. The signs of the coefficients on these three factors are consistent with economic intuition, in that a deterioration in domestic economic conditions captured by a decrease in the local stock market results in an increase in the price of credit protection.
Similarly, an increase in the price of USD expressed in terms of the domestic currency is associated with an increase in the CDS spread. Lastly, a decrease in domestic foreign 11 Since we are interested in empirical regularities across countries, we include as explanatory variables the subset of factors that are country-specific: (i) the weekly percentage return of the USD-denominated Dow Jones Total Market country index, (ii) the weekly percentage return of the exchange rate relative to the USD, (iii) the weekly change in the USD-value of exchange rate reserves and (iv) the weekly percentage return to the domestic orthogonalized Dow Jones Total Market Financials index.
12 The magnitude of the point estimate, however, differs markedly. To a large extent, this is driven by the degree of collinearity between ∆BAi and R LF it . Countries growing their financial system at a faster rate also experience stronger fluctuations in the return to local financials. This correlation leads to a positive estimate of δ in specification (2), which somewhat offsets the effect of ρ.
exchange reserves is associated with a decrease in the CDS spread.
EMU Member Countries
Our second hypothesis concerns the differential effect of the global and local financial system on sovereign CDS spreads for countries in the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union. Out of the 16 countries in our sample, 10 are EMU members.
Hence, these countries share the Euro as a common currency. 13 
Monetary policy in Eurozone countries is defined and implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB).
Crucially, the ECB has the exclusive authority to authorize the issuance of euro bank notes, and eurozone countries cannot monetize any euro-denominated outstanding debt by printing domestic currency. Hence, inflexibility in monetary policy and the inability to print domestic currency may affect a country's default probability. For this reason we believe that during the recent financial crisis, eurozone CDS spreads may have exhibited more sensitivity to the health of financial system than their non-eurozone counterparts.
Hypothesis 2. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price of sovereign CDS, then we expect this effect to be stronger for EMU-countries versus Non-EMU countries.
We stratify the sample by EMU and non-EMU countries, and also sort countries by their level of θ i , leading to four bins. The two non-eurozone bins contain three countries each, whereas the eurozone bins contain five countries each. As before, we The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7 under the double sorts tab. The estimated factor loadings γ j are statistically significant and monotonically increasing for each bin. A test of the null hypothesis that the estimates of γ j are equal for the two extreme bins, Non-EMU & low θ and EMU & high θ is rejected with 5% confidence. In fact, the loading on the EMU & high θ bin is almost three times as large as the loading on the Non-EMU & low θ bin. For eurozone countries with high levels of θ, a one standard deviation change in the return to global financials leads to a 0.3 standard deviation change in the level of the sovereign CDS spread. The point estimates for δ j reveal a similar story, as they are statistically insignificant for all but the EMU & high θ bin. For this bin, the factor loading is economically large and significant at the 1% level, corroborating the above results.
Exposure to Subprime Securities
Our third hypothesis addresses a common perception that subprime securities played a key role in the financial crisis. Securities backed with subprime mortgages were widely held by financial institutions and, as a result of increased default rates and delinquencies, lost a majority of their value during the financial crisis. If governments explicitly or implicitly assumed financial sector liabilities during this period, we might expect that a country's CDS spread sensitivity towards the financial system is larger if domestic banks were heavily invested in the subprime sector.
Hypothesis 3. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price of sovereign CDS, then we expect this effect to be stronger for countries with higher exposures to the subprime mortgage sector.
In order to compute a country's exposure to the subprime mortgage sector, we obtain a time series of the ABX.HE index. This index tracks the price of CDSs on a set of 20 equal-weighted, AAA-rated US subprime mortgage-backed securities issued within six months of each other. 14 If a country's financial sector was heavily exposed 14 The first index launched in January 2006, with new on-the-run indices being introduced every six months, each time referencing 20 new subprime mortgage-backed securities. The up-front payment required to insure the underlying securities is then given by 100 minus the value of the index, taken as a percentage of the notional. Additionally, there exists a fixed annual payment, also expressed as a percentage of the notional. This quoting convention is standard in up-front CDS markets. Suppose, for the sake of example, that an investor would like to insure $10m of underlying mortgage-backed securities. If the index trades at 70, this equates to an up-front payment of $3m (30% of the $10m notional). Hence the value of the index correlates inversely with the default likelihood of the underlying securities.
to subprime securities, then the return to domestic financials should co-move with the performance of the ABX.HE index. 15 Hence, for each country, we regress R LF it on the percentage return to the index, and then rank countries by the absolute magnitude of the standardized coefficient. If hypothesis 3 is correct, we should expect that countries in the high subprime exposure bin exhibit a stronger co-movement with local and global financials compared to countries in the low bin.
The first two columns in Table 9 refer to a single sort based on the absolute magnitude of the coefficient. Interestingly, both the low and high subprime exposure bins have similar loadings on the world financials return. Although market participants accounted for the systemic risk posed by the global financial sector, the degree of co-movement did not differ based on countries' subprime exposures. A test for γ low = γ high cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. Based on the coefficient estimate for δ i , it is apparent that the effect of the local financial sector also does not conform to hypothesis 3. Again, a test for δ low = δ high reveals that there is no difference in coefficient estimates, and the double sort based on subprime exposure and the level of θ confirms this result.
Explaining CDS Spread Levels
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on CDS spread changes. However, if a country's exposure to the financial sector is associated with its default intensity process, it will also affect the level of the CDS spread. To control for factors other than the financials exposure, we rely on structural models of default to furnish a set of control variables. Ericsson et al. (2009) show that leverage and asset volatility, two important theoretical determinants of credit risk, are also correlated with the level of corporate CDS spreads. Hence, we compute the sovereign analogues to leverage and asset volatility using the quarterly time series of total debt outstanding over Gross Domestic Product, as recently analyzed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) , and also the 90 day rolling window volatilities of the domestic equity market. To control for the size of the country, as 15 Conversations with CDS and MBS traders anecdotally confirmed that the ABX.HE index is the most watched index in the subprime mortgage segment.
well as whether it is a member of the EMU, we utilize the level of total equity market capitalization and an EMU dummy.
Hypothesis 4. If a change in the condition of the financial system matters for the price of sovereign CDS, then we expect the level of the CDS spread to be higher for high-θ (∆BA) versus low-θ (∆BA) countries.
We specify a cross-sectional panel regression with time fixed-effects given by
where z i stands for either θ i or ∆BA i , and time fixed-effects are captured by ν t .
The estimates of γ shown in Table 10 suggest that both θ i and ∆BA i are important factors in determining the level of sovereign CDS spreads. In specification (1), for example, a sovereign's debt to GDP ratio accounts for roughly 26bps of CDS spread level post-crisis, whereas θ i accounts for roughly 39bps (using the cross-sectional average of the debt to GDP ratio and θ i ). As expected, the effect of θ i is significantly weaker pre-crisis, around one third the post-crisis magnitude.
The EMU dummy has a large and negative effect on the level of sovereign CDS spreads across all specifications. This suggests that countries in the EMU were generally seen as less likely to default and hence traded at lower spread levels. To some extent, this is associated with EMU countries having better average credit ratings in our sample. Additionally, market participants may have implicitly assumed that countries in the EMU will provide mutual support and hence are unlikely to default unilaterally.
Furthermore, the large difference in the coefficient magnitude pre and post crisis suggests that the status of EMU membership was particulary relevant during the financial crisis.
Conclusion
Our results document a private-to-public risk transfer related to countries' exposures to the financial system during the recent economic crisis. This channel led to significant co-movement between the price of insurance against default and the performance of the financial sector, both locally and globally. We show the pattern differs across countries operating under different monetary authorities. Although the level of CDS spreads is lower for countries in the EMU, their sensitivities to the health of the financial system are higher compared to non-EMU members.
For future research it might be useful to analyze a public-to-public risk transfer, in addition to the private-to-public risk transfer. In light of the recent debt crisis surrounding Greece and other European economies, several countries consider extending significant aid packages. This fiscal insurance mechanism might also be reflected in sovereign CDS market prices. Not only could this shed further light on the default barrier of advanced economies, it would also allow for the quantification of the wealth transfer among nations embedded in government guarantees. to the factors used in Longstaff et al. (2009) but computed using European data. Reported coefficients are standardized and t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five percent and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Reported coefficients are standardized and t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five percent and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Table 8 : Cross-sectional Regression. This table reports the results of a crosssectional panel regression of the form ∆CDS it = X T it β + γz i + δR LF it + ρz i R LF it + ν t + it . z i stands for either θ i (Specification 1) or ∆BA i (Specification 2). Time fixed-effects are captured by ν t . Reported coefficients are in basis points and t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five percent and tenpercent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) Countries' exposure to sub-prime is determined by the magnitude of the coefficient in a regression of local financials returns on returns to the ABX.HE (AAA) index. Reported coefficients are standardized and t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five percent and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Table 10 : Sovereign CDS Spread Levels. This table reports results from a crosssectional panel regression of CDS spread levels on explanatory variables. The regression specification is given by CDS it = X T it β + γθ i + δ∆BA i + ν t + it . Time fixed-effects are captured by ν t . Specification (1) omits ∆BA i , (2) omits θ i and (3) includes both variables. Pre and Post refers to pre-crisis and post-crisis. The breakpoint is defined by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (9/15/2008). Reported coefficients are standardized and t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Significance at the one-percent, five percent and ten-percent level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) 
